

**Review  
of the  
Enabling State Programme Nepal**

**Binod Bhattarai**

**For DFID Nepal**

**March 2005**

## **Executive Summary**

The Enabling State Programme was initiated by DFID Nepal in 1998 and launched in January 2001 to help Nepali people achieve 'pro-poor' governance. It is supporting the development of understanding of pro-poor governance concepts amongst key Nepalese actors and donor agencies working in the governance field. Its original vision was to form a critical mass of advocates for change in Nepali society by identifying individuals working in key governance areas whose work could be supported initially through exploratory projects and then potentially through larger satellite projects. ESP has undergone several changes in its way of working since its initiation.

An output to purpose review (OPR) of ESP was conducted in February 2003 following which an addendum to the programme document was agreed which substantially changed the original design by emphasizing the identification of key 'reformers' and reducing the emphasis on the concept of 'change advocates.' The new emphasis of the programme is to be on achieving change directly. The success of satellite projects is therefore to be based on the progress projects make on achieving their purpose. An ESP advisory group chaired by the OPMCM secretary has been established to provide an external reference forum for the programme.

The 2003 addendum extended phase 1 of ESP to January 2006, although it was recognised that satellite projects might continue after that date. The addendum suggested the options for continuing these projects might include a) a second phase of ESP, b) partial continuation of ESP on a reduced basis, and c) transferring the responsibility for these projects to DFID Nepal.

A review of ESP was conducted from 24 January to 10 February 2005 to assess the effectiveness of ESP in achieving its purpose as set out in the November 2003 revised project log frame. This review has found that the progress towards achieving these outputs has been pretty satisfactory. It has also found that the outcomes of the exploratory activities have been instrumental in identifying key areas of governance and the associated agencies should be encouraged and strengthened.

The key areas of governance that ESP is working in are anti-corruption; access to justice; social inclusion; and service delivery. Reform agencies and institutions that ESP has identified, encouraged and strengthened to pursue these key agenda of governance have been:

- FNCCI, Pro Public, CIJ and Himal Association on anti-corruption;
- CVICT along with district based NGOs, and DOPM on access to justice; and
- NEFIN and DNF on social inclusion.

ESP is contributing significantly to delivering the objectives of DFID's Country Assistance Plan (CAP) and HMGN's Tenth Plan as the objectives of its satellite projects fit the CAP and Tenth Plan pillars. For example, the objectives of the Community Mediation Extension Project and the FNCCI Anti-Corruption Project fit the CAP and the Tenth Plan good governance pillars. The PMO Strengthening Project crosses all pillars, the NPDP fits with the peace building pillar, SDPPP and NGO Federation Project fit with all four pillars of broad-based growth, social development, social inclusion and good governance. JEP and DEIP fit the three pillars of social inclusion, governance and peace building whilst the DOPM Project fits the good governance and peace building pillars.

Since it began ESP has acquired valuable lessons and has emerged as a mature and reliable institution for improving governance in Nepal. The main lessons learned from ESP's work have been:

- ESP's process of exploring innovative Nepali ideas through exploratory activities and putting viable ideas into action by enlarging them into satellite projects on key governance areas has enhanced the feeling of ownership of these initiatives by partners. The process has led to 13 projects of which 10 are running in association with various government, non-government, civil society and private sector agencies.
- ESP has emerged as a reliable support institution for implementing reforms through key reform agencies of the government, non-government, civil societies and the private sector. Examples of this are prison improvement, improvements in the office infrastructure of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (OPMCM), delivery of services through community enabling centres (CECs), access to justice and alternative dispute resolution at the local level through the Community Mediation Project, and building public opinion against corruption through anti-corruption initiatives.
- The support for and confidence in ESP shown by these key reform agencies is testimony to the value added by ESP on which the solid base of its second phase should be founded.
- ESP is in the best position to manage satellite projects. It is in a good position to react to the inevitable unforeseen issues concerning the management of satellite projects. The transfer of the responsibility for these projects to DFID Nepal seems to be impractical as DFID Nepal's decision making process may be costlier. Besides DFID Nepal may not have enough expertise to look after ESP's satellite projects.
- ESP's innovative process of developing satellite projects from indigenous ideas should be continued in the second phase. The partial continuation of ESP on a reduced basis or continuation until the end of the ongoing satellite projects is inconceivable as it would be tantamount to ESP's lowering priority to the reform of key governance areas.
- The best option is to develop the second phase of ESP into a more autonomous and Nepali-owned institution devoted to governance reforms on the solid foundation of what has been learned from the first phase. ESP could evolve into a consortium of INGOs and NGOs that are on the same wavelength. While DFID could support this consortium with core funds to meet its overheads and limited project costs, other consortium partners could contribute (pool) their funds and expertise to initiate other projects.

Major political developments that happened during the review have important implications for ESP's future role. On 1 February 2005, the King took the powers of government into his own hands. He imposed a state of emergency, suspended many constitutional provisions including those on civil rights, removed the incumbent government, arrested many political leaders and human right activists, and curtailed press freedom. The reasons for this were given as the failure of the incumbent government to bring the political parties to a consensus and halt the escalating violence perpetrated by the Maoist rebels by bringing them to the negotiating table. The King in his proclamation repeatedly stressed his unwavering faith on multiparty parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy, and the role and importance of political parties and human rights in augmenting Nepal's polity. These events have raised the viability of a second phase of ESP.

A second phase of ESP should focus on:

- Dalit, Janjati, anti-corruption and access to justice issues;

- strengthening political parties to make them more participatory and accountable to the people and state;
- developing a responsible media, particularly the electronic media; and
- working with youths and young leaders of the country to make them more democratic and accountable to the people, society and state.

## Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Contents</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Abbreviations</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>2 Review Background</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>3 Progress Towards Achieving Purpose</b> .....	<b>8</b>
3.1 Progress in delivering programme outputs .....	8
3.2 Progress at the purpose level .....	10
3.3 ESP's contribution to delivering DFID CAP Objectives.....	14
3.4 Potential new risks for ESP and satellite projects.....	15
<b>4 ESP Management</b> .....	<b>16</b>
4.1 Management changes .....	16
4.2 Role of Programme Advisory Committee (PAC).....	17
4.3 ESP and Nepali partners.....	17
<b>5 Lessons Learned and ESP's Future</b> .....	<b>18</b>
5.1 Lessons learned .....	18
5.2 A second phase of ESP .....	18
5.3 Continuation of ESP on reduced basis.....	20
5.4 Transfer of responsibility to DFID Nepal.....	20
5.5 Registration as an NGO.....	20
<b>Appendix 1 Terms of Reference</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>Appendix 2 Attachments to Review ToR</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>Appendix 2.1 Addendum to ESP Programme Document, November 2003</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>Appendix 2.2 ESP (PHASE 1), Revised Logframe (in Nov-03 addendum)</b> .....	<b>29</b>
<b>Appendix 2.3 ToR for ESP Programme Advisory Group (in Nov-03 addendum)</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>Appendix 2.4 The Future Role of ESP (DFID internal document)</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>Appendix 3 ESP's Progress Against its Purpose and Outputs</b> .....	<b>34</b>
<b>Appendix 4 Key Features of Various Institutions</b> .....	<b>36</b>
<b>Appendix 5 Status of ESP Satellite Projects</b> .....	<b>37</b>
<b>Appendix 6 Original and Revised Log-frames Compared</b> .....	<b>45</b>
<b>Appendix 7 Persons Met in the Course of the Review</b> .....	<b>48</b>
<b>Appendix 8 Documents and Websites Consulted</b> .....	<b>51</b>

## **Abbreviations**

CAP	Country Assistance Plan
CBO	community based organisation
CEC	community enabling centres
CIAA	Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authorities
CIJ	Centre for Investigative Journalism
CVICT	Centre for the Victims of Torture
CLRC	Community Legal Research Centre
CMEP	Community Mediation Extension Project
CSACP	Civil Society Anti-Corruption Project
CMP-I	Community Mediation Project (First Phase)
DDC	district development committee
DEIP	Dalit Empowerment and Integration Project
DFIDN	Department for International Development Nepal
DGB	District Governance Bill
DNF	Dalit NGO Federation
DOPMP	Department of Prison Management Project
DPPP	District Periodic Planning Project
ESP	Enabling State Programme
FEDO	Feminist Dalit Organisation
FNCCI-ACP	Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Anti-Corruption Project
FPSD	Foundation for Parliamentary Studies and Development
FY	fiscal year
GMSA	Ganesh Man Singh Academy
HURPES	Human Rights and Peace Society
INGO	international non-government organisation
PIJP	Peace and Investigative Journalism Project
ISNFDIN	Institutional Support to Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities
JEP	Janjati Empowerment Project
JGF	Japanese Grant Facility
LAN	local area network
NCCS	Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies
NCDC	Nepal Community Development Centre
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEFIN	Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities
NGOFP	NGO Federation Project
NGO	non-government organization
NPDP	Nepal Police Development Project
NTV	Nepal Television
OPMCM	Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers
OPMCM SP	OPMCM Strengthening Project
OPR	output to purpose review
PMAS	Poverty Monitoring and Analysis System
PMP	Project Management Partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RSDC	Rural Self Reliance Development Centre
SDPPP	Self-Reliant Development of the Poor by the Poor Project
SWC	Social Welfare Council
TMS	Total Management Services
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
VDC	village development committee
WB	The World Bank

## **1 Introduction**

ESP has undergone several major changes since it began in 1998. The latest one happened in September 2003 when it was agreed to reduce ESP's emphasis on 'change advocates' and focus instead on promoting reform institutions. These changes led to the November 2003 revision to ESP's log frame and the extension of ESP's Phase 1 by a year to January 2006.

The current review (see ToR at Appendix 1 and ToR attachments at Appendix 2) has been conducted to assess the effectiveness of ESP in achieving the objectives (purpose) set out in the November 2003 addendum and revised project log-frame (Appendices 2.1 and 2.2). Also attached to the ToR was an internal DFID paper pointing to issues on the future role of ESP (Appendix 2.4).

The review took place from 24 January to 10 February 2005 during which consultations were carried out with DFIDN staff, ESP staff, HMGN key officials, partner organization staff and officials, grassroots workers, and beneficiaries of satellite projects (Appendices 4 and 7). A three-day field visit to Jhapa district was conducted to gain first hand information from some satellite project partners. A list of persons consulted in Jhapa and at the central level in the course of this review is given in Appendix 7. A list of the publications consulted is given at Appendix 8. The preliminary findings of the review were provided to DFID Nepal's senior governance advisor on 9 and 14 February 2005.

Major political developments that happened during the review have important implications for the future role of ESP. On 1 February 2005, the King took the powers of government into his own hands. He imposed a state of emergency, suspended many constitutional provisions including those on civil rights, removed the incumbent government, arrested many political leaders and human right activists, and curtailed press freedom. The King has explained that he took these actions due to the failure of the incumbent government to bring major political parties to a consensus and halt the escalating violence perpetrated by the Maoists by bringing them to the negotiating table. This incident provides opportunities for ESP to continue its work on investigating and working to overcome the fundamental causes of the current situation of governance in Nepal.

This review assesses the progress of ESP with a focus on the progress made since the February 2003 OPR. It assesses changes in the management structure and examines the options for ESP in its second phase keeping in view the lessons learned by ESP since it started and the forthcoming scenario of the governance since the King's 1 February proclamation.

I wish to acknowledge the kind cooperation from ESP during the review. ESP provided much logistical support. I appreciate the efforts of Arun Dhoj Adhikary, programme manager and other ESP professional staff for providing me enough time to ponder and discuss important issues. I gratefully acknowledge the time and crucial inputs provided by Alan Whaites, senior governance advisor and Dr. Hiramani Ghimire, governance advisor of DFIDN. I also thank the many other persons who answered questions and provided valuable suggestions for the future course of ESP.

## **2 Review Background**

The Enabling State Programme was launched by DFID Nepal in January 2001 to help Nepali people achieve a 'pro-poor' governance environment. It intended to support the development of understanding of pro-poor governance amongst key Nepalese actors and donor agencies working in governance in Nepal. Its original vision was to form a critical mass of advocates for change in Nepali society by identifying individuals working in key governance areas whose work could be supported initially through exploratory project and then potentially through larger satellite projects. The plan was for DFID Nepal to look after these satellite projects. ESP is formally attached to the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (OPMCM).

ESP has undergone several changes in its operational modalities since it began. In July 2002 DFID Nepal handed over much of its management responsibilities over satellite projects to ESP.

The 2003 OPR led to the November 2003 addendum to the programme document. This substantially changed the original design by emphasising the identification of key 'reformers' and reducing the emphasis on 'change advocates,' as it was recognised that reformers could include organisations, coalitions and others. It was also decided to narrow the scope of ESP's focus to areas within DFID Nepal's Country Assistance Plan (CAP). This new emphasis is on achieving change directly. The success of satellite projects is therefore to be based on progress against purpose. An ESP advisory group under the chairmanship of the OPMCM secretary was established to provide an external reference forum for ESP. The addendum also extended Phase 1 of the ESP programme office to January 2006. It recognised that satellite projects could continue after that date and suggested three options for these projects to continue: a) a second phase of ESP, b) partial continuation of ESP on a reduced basis, or c) transfer of responsibility to DFID Nepal.

### **3 Progress Towards Achieving Purpose**

This chapter assesses the progress made by ESP towards achieving its purpose that was reformulated following the February 2003 OPR. See Appendix 3 for a summary of the progress made by ESP in achieving its purpose and outputs.

#### **3.1 Progress in delivering programme outputs**

ESP has made pretty satisfactory progress towards achieving its three outputs. The progress made against each output has been as follows.

##### **3.1.1 Output 1**

- The minimum quantitative target of the first output (Better understanding gained of change processes in governance in Nepal) has been met. ESP's study reports seem to have direct or indirect linkages with the change processes of governance. It provides additional understanding in key areas of governance
- Learning derived from the study reports have been incorporated in the design of the Civil Society Anti-Corruption Project that started in January 2005 and in the pipeline projects the Community Mediation and Development Project, and the Institutional Support to NFDIN project.

##### ***Comments and recommendations***

- The objective verifiable indicator (OVI) target seems quite low as regards the production of reports per year. Lots of innovative actions are being carried out in the poverty alleviation and governance sectors. Studies on them will tremendously help other donors to design future projects.

##### **3.1.2 Output 2**

- The second output ("Better understanding of governance issues imparted through exploratory activities and satellite projects") has the OVI of at supporting at least 8 conferences, workshops and seminars per year attended by key stakeholders. This has been achieved.
- The second OVI of publishing at least 4 publications per year has not been met. Only 6 publications have been made in the 2003-2004 period.
- The third OVI does not prescribe any quantitative target and is specified as other necessary measures to disseminate lessons from satellite projects. This seems to have been carried out with 4 television programmes and 1 video.

##### ***Comments and recommendations***

- ESP has conducted 71 exploratory activities since the February 2003 OPR. Of these 26 conferences, workshops and seminars have been held. Most of these events have been held in the Kathmandu Valley and it is therefore recommended that more such events should be carried out outside the Valley.
- Television programmes and videos should be held in major regional languages. This would greatly help disseminating lessons learned to a large audience and widening the scope of more relevant actions thereafter.

### **3.1.3 Output 3**

- The 71 exploratory activities conducted after the OPR seem to have made ESP better known to relevant parties about its actions in the key areas of governance. More than 1000 persons representing government, non-government, academic sectors and political parties are estimated to have participated in the workshops, seminars and conferences held on the key governance issues of anti-corruption, access to justice, social inclusion and service delivery. The televised programmes on anti-corruption and justice have been effective and reached scores of viewers. Research and training programmes have covered the range of academia. Similarly, six publications have covered the key issues of governance such as social justice, inclusion and anti-corruption.
- The piloting of exploratory activities and the experiences gained in satellite projects have been instrumental in developing satellite projects on anti-corruption (FNCCI-ACP and CS-ACP), social justice (CMEP, DOPM, CMDEP and PIJP), inclusion (DEIP, JEP and NFDIN) and service delivery (NPDP).
- The third output (Satellite projects in key governance areas designed, approved and launched) has the OVI target of launching 20 satellite projects in key areas of governance with a £15 million budget. In this case, the targets set for both the number and budget are being. ESP management's opinion that the achievement of £13.80 million approximates the commitment of £15 million budget for satellite projects during Phase I. However, excluding the OPMCM Strengthening Project and NPDP, the expenditures on all of the other eight ongoing projects has been only £1.71 million or 20% of committed funds.

#### ***Comments and recommendations***

- The disbursement of funds cannot be expected to strike the target in the remaining 11 months period of Phase I. This situation calls for a decision to be made on the institutional arrangements for the continuation of these projects after Phase I of ESP in January 2006.
- Regarding the OPMCM Strengthening Project, there have been some reservations on the involvement of a bilateral donor in such a sensitive and high echelon part of the government. An episode of the popular weekly NTV programme Bahas aired a year ago took a negative stance on donor assistance to the PMO.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, OPMCM officials credit the project for some important achievements. The following main achievements would not have happened without the project:
  - the merger of the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Secretariat;
  - the installation of a computer network and intranet connections between the OPMCM and other ministries and departments,
  - the creation of a databank of all post-1990 cabinet decisions.

The real benefits of these undertakings will be seen once the activities of other ministries and departments begin to be monitored through the intranet system.

- The project has also contributed to developing a citizen's charter for government offices providing services; a code of conduct for the prime minister's advisors, ministers and

---

<sup>1</sup>The discussion was between NPC Vice-Chairman Shankar Sharma and programme conductor Indra Lohani. It asked why the government was not allocating taxpayers' money to strengthening the PMO but was instead getting a donor to meet this need. It also asked which donor could turn down such a request coming from such a sensitive high-level organ of the government.

civil servants and a policy audit mechanism — the first of its kind in Nepal — including the development of indicators for 15 important governance-related policies.

- The delay in the delivery of 65 computers caused considerable delay in setting up the OPMCM's intranet system. However, the OPMCM does not have adequate human resources to use the information that will come from the ministries and departments once the intranet is operational. Follow-ups and monitoring the functioning of ministries and departments and district service providers needs proper human resources to carry out in time. It is recommended that some of the projects unspent budget could be used for this.
- Since the linkage with OPMCM carries considerable importance, some sort of link should be maintained even after the OPMCM Strengthening Project finishes.
- For the Nepal Police Development project, the building of 12 district training classrooms is a significant achievement. But little has been done to improve the training curriculum. There is a problem in convening project steering committee meetings as the chairperson of the committee has almost no time to attend the meetings. So ownership problems are likely to emerge. To overcome this, a nucleus committee should be set up to work on behalf of the steering committee. Also, the addition of a Nepali consultant such as a retired inspector general or deputy IG to the project could help to expedite ownership by the Nepal Police.

### **3.2 Progress at the purpose level**

ESP's purpose is, "Nepalese reformers in key areas of governance identified, encouraged and strengthened." This seems to be sensible. The outcomes of ESP's exploratory activities have identified key areas of governance and the main agencies associated with these areas that could be encouraged and strengthened. However, unlike the original 2001 ESP purpose that provided quantitative targets of OVIs, the 2003 addendum does not provide quantitative OVI targets at the purpose level (Appendix 6). This has increased the scope for subjective judgments. Nevertheless, the progress at the purpose level has been as follows.

ESP has taken anti-corruption, access to justice, social inclusion, and service delivery as the major areas of governance it is working on. Some of the main reform agencies and institutions that ESP has identified, encouraged and strengthened to pursue the key governance agenda items are as follows:

- Anti-corruption — FNCCI, Pro Public and the Himal Association are the agencies that ESP has worked with to implement anti-corruption initiatives. The projects are FNCCI-ACP, and CSACP.
- Access to justice — CVICT with its district NGO partners is implementing CMEP (CMDP) and DOPM is implementing the DOPM Project.
- Social inclusion — NEFIN is implementing JEP and DNF is implementing DEIP.
- Service delivery — OPMCM, NGO Federation and RSDC are implementing projects related to service delivery (OPMCM Strengthening Project, NGO Federation Project, and SDPPP).

#### **3.2.1 Purpose OVI 1 — Success of satellite projects**

See Appendix 5 for summary information on each satellite project's progress

**a. Community Mediation Extension Project: successful**

- Has resolved about 3000 disputes at the community level.
- Has drawn attention of the judiciary to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism at the community level. A circular to this effect was sent by the Supreme Court to all district courts to take note of verdicts made under CMEP and enrol trained community mediators developed under CMEP. The project has also elicited the support of local police.
- Local government (VDCs and DDCs) have begun to allocate budgets and provide office space for VDC mediation committees. There is ample scope for the internalization of community mediation by local government bodies.
- Local mediation committee members are volunteers. The mediators themselves (e.g. in Duagadhi VDC, Jhapa) say that they should not be paid an honorarium as this could pollute the sanctity of mediation procedures.
- Easy exit of the project after completion.
- Growing people's faith in the judgment of mediation committees.
- Local Maoists are said to be supportive of the process and because of this VDC secretaries are allowed to run their offices.
- A pioneering approach that has generated skilled mediators at the community level and trained local NGOs in the approach.

***Comments and recommendations:***

- CMEP should be expanded to other mountain, hill and Terai districts in all five development regions.
- An experience sharing forum should be set up.
- Moderate physical assistance should be provided to district courts to garner more support to community level mediation committees.

**b. Dalit Empowerment and Inclusion Project: partially successful**

- First project for Dalits in Nepal; but expenditure rate is slow.
- Difficulty in bringing consortium NGOs to one point of action partly due to rivalries among the leaders of these NGOs.
- The Project Advisory Committee (PAC) and the implementing agency (TMS) did not work too well in the beginning. Corrections made by reorganizing the PAC, allowing pent-up grievances of consortium members to be aired, vesting PAC with more authority and trimming TMS down to be only a support agency have helped DEIP to make progress.

***Comments and recommendations:***

- TMS was hired on the assumption that Dalits did not have the capacity to run the project on their own. It was learnt that least attention has been paid to building up this capacity among them. Spoon-feeding may turn out to be costlier in future. A two or three-year phase-wise capacity building initiative for project management must be undertaken.
- A consortium secretariat should be formed with personnel drawn from member NGOs. TMS could train them, and then mentor these personnel for some period, and later leave them to work alone with occasional backstopping.

**c. NGO Federation Project: partly successful**

- Although project expenditure has been about 55%, most district level NGOs are not aware of the project. For example, NCDC of Jhapa (a member of the NGO Federation), the Human Rights Forum of Ilam and Human Rights, and Social Development Academy of Saptari did not know about the project. These are the CMEP district partner NGOs.

**Comments and recommendations:**

- It is rather awkward that the three CMEP district NGOs are unaware of this project. In the context of charges being levelled against NGO movement in Nepal for being associated with one or other political parties, such cases should not be allowed to malign the movement itself.

**d. DOPM Project: successful**

- Although the investment made under the project is low, it is beginning to take forwards innovations in Nepal's penal system. The community service and open prison concepts are new for Nepal. The prisons being transformed into reform centres and the inmates beginning to be treated accordingly are new for prison management officials and inmates. High level DOPM officials give credit to the provisions made in the project for such changes, as the proposal for reforms could be pushed citing such provisions and approved by the cabinet without much difficulty. Ordinance to that effect has been promulgated and the regulation, with much more progressive provisions is about to be approved.

**Comments and recommendations:**

- People and human rights organizations should be made aware of such changes. Prison improvement and allocation of budget on it generally gets a low priority in South Asia. Such awareness could help to build continuous pressure on the government to allocate its own resources for further improvements in the penal system.
- It is recommended that the open prison and community service be extended to other parts of the country.

**e. OPMCM Strengthening Project: successful**

- Provisions made in this project brought about the merger between the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat in September 2003. The project's main achievements have been developing a new type of citizen's charter on government service delivery, installing intranet connections between the OPMCM and ministries and departments, the initiation of standard operating procedures, exposure of OPMCM officials to other more advanced systems elsewhere. A new system of policy auditing is about to be initiated under the project, hitherto unknown in Nepal. This is expected to shed much light on the status of implementation to provide useful inputs for formulating more relevant policies.

**Comments and recommendations:**

- The OPMCM is the highest echelon in the country's bureaucracy. A more efficient OPMCM with an improved monitoring mechanism should improve the delivery of services by other ministries and departments. The OPMCM's human resources need urgently developing. It is recommended that ESP should not leave the OPMCM altogether after the project has ended but should maintain some sort of linkage through follow-up support.

**f. FNCCI Anti-Corruption Project: partly successful**

- This project has only spent 16% of its budget. The project is a new kind of donor support for Nepal where business-related corruption is very large. As corruption increases the cost of transacting businesses, the costs of corruption are shifted to consumers, most of whom are poor. The project aims to reduce this corruption and thus will promote pro-poor governance. It has produced a business code of ethics and its action plan has been chalked out and orientation to district units given through business people's organisations.

**Comments and recommendations:**

- Anti-corruption is a key area of governance. Since the project was launched DFID has also started to support the CIAA project. It is important that these two and other such initiatives share their experiences in some type of common forum.

**g. Nepal Police Development Project: partly successful**

- Most of this project's expenditure has gone on building the district training classrooms. Much less attention has been given to the software side, such as developing the training curriculum. The problem of ownership is a dilemma for this project.
- Transforming the 'police force' into a 'police service' had been on the agenda of all governments since 1990. The concept of community policing has been initiated and police kiosks were established on many city corners. These have been supply-side initiatives. Many of the kiosks were later closed for being easy prey to agitating demonstrators. The demand for service-oriented police has yet to evolve. An opinion building campaign could help to generate such demand from communities.

**h. Self-Reliant Development of the Poor by the Poor Project: successful**

- SDPPP has met its targets and exceeded some of them such as household coverage. It has facilitated people to institutionalize their local organisations into multipurpose cooperatives, and 14 of these cooperatives have become registered and more than NR 10 million savings built up. Amongst others, Dalits and Muslims have benefited.

**Comments and recommendations:**

- SDPPP has met most of its targets within three of its six years and after spending only 37% of its budget. Three hill project districts were replaced by more accessible Terai districts but expenditure rates have remained relatively low. In such case either the beneficiary households should have been increased or the budget should have been trimmed keeping in view the lower costs in the Terai.

**3.2.2 Purpose OVI 2 — Satellite projects scaled-up (where relevant)**

- CMP extended to CMEP and it is now being considered to scale up to a Community Mediation Development Project (CMDP). The Maoists have not disturbed these project activities in the districts but have been supportive.

**3.2.3 Purpose OVI 3.1 — Coalitions of reformers built**

- ESP has been able to bring six Dalit NGOs into a consortium in DEIP.
- The Janajati Empowerment project has also brought together ethnic minorities NGOs.

### **3.2.4 Purpose OVI 3.2 — Government/non government partnerships developed**

- CMEP has drawn adequate attention from the judiciary. A directive from the Supreme Court was circulated to all district courts to pay attention to decisions made by village mediation committees. Local police have welcomed mediation committees' work to resolve local disputes. District courts have begun making lists of trained local mediators. An alternative dispute resolution methodology is being evolved through a new partnership between the judiciary, police, and district NGOs.
- A new partnership between NGOs and HMGN's Department of Prison Management is beginning to implement the DOPM Project.

### **3.2.5 Purpose OVI 3.3 — Reformers better linked to external experience and expertise**

- Nepali NGO personnel have learned lessons from Bangladesh's NGO movement and have become linked to Bangladesh NGOs through the NGO Federation Project.
- ESP supported a workshop on restructuring the Nepali state (NCCS). Yash Ghai, Professor of Law at Hong Kong University and Chairperson of Kenya's Constitutional Review Committee, led the workshop by talking on changing democratic structures in multi-ethnic states. In a follow-up workshop international scholars Neera Chandoke and Gopal Guru from India, and Nico Steyler from South Africa interacted with senior political leaders, professionals, and social activists.
- The workshop on better understanding of political issues for emerging leaders was attended by about 40 young leaders of major political parties (GMSA).
- Talk programme on the role of facilitators for facilitation of peace talks — Sharing International Experience, was run by FPSD.
- The workshop on negotiating with the Maoists to bring mainstream political parties to the peace process was run by FPSD in 11 towns across Nepal.
- A 3-day conference on 'The Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali Democracy' was held in April 2003.

### **3.3 ESP's contribution to delivering DFID CAP Objectives**

- The Tenth Plan's poverty reduction strategy has the four pillars of (i) broad based economic growth, (ii) social development, (iii) targeted programmes for the ultra-poor, vulnerable and deprived groups (who may not adequately benefit from the first two pillars), and (iv) good governance. All four pillars are closely related and essential for improving the lives of the poor and for mainstreaming very poor and deprived groups. In implementing the four-pillar strategy the plan stresses strategic cross-cutting approaches to (a) redefine the role of the state, and limit public interventions, (b) promote private sector development and enlist the involvement of the private sector, NGOs, INGOs and CBOs in the implementation of key activities, (c) promote community participation in managing activities at the local level, and (d) accelerating the decentralization process, which is also a key element under good governance.
- Corresponding to the poverty reduction strategies of the Tenth plan, DFID published its Nepal Country Assistance Plan (CAP) for 2004-08. Its overall purpose is to reduce poverty and social exclusion for lasting peace in Nepal. CAP has five pillars. Its first pillar 'Growth for the Rural Poor' corresponds to the tenth Plan's first pillar of Broad-based Economic Growth. CAP's second pillar 'Basic Services' fits the Tenth Plan's second pillar of Social Development. CAP's third pillar fits in with the Tenth Plan's third pillar that focuses on 'social inclusion' to help women and excluded caste and ethnic

groups. Corresponding to the fourth pillar of 'Good Governance', CAP specifies that governance should become more responsive to the interests of the poor and excluded. CAP has the fifth pillar of 'Peace Building' to help end violent conflict and create the conditions in which the causes of poverty and conflict are addressed.

- ESP is contributing significantly to delivering the objectives of both CAP and the Tenth Plan as its satellite projects fit with both CAP and the Tenth Plan's pillars. CMEP and the FNCCI-ACP address the good governance pillar. The PMO Strengthening Project crosses all pillars. NPDP fits with the peace building pillar. SDPPP and NGOFP fit all four pillars. JEP and DEIP fit the three pillars of social inclusion, governance and peace building whilst the DOPM Project fits in the two pillars of good governance and peace building.

### **3.4 Potential new risks for ESP and satellite projects**

ESP's satellite projects address the needs of all kinds of stakeholders, from government policy makers to socially and economically excluded and deprived community people. It has suffered no disturbances even from warring Maoists as most of its satellite projects fit the general demands for corruption-free and inclusive socio-economic polity in Nepal.

The post-1 February 2005 King-led government has vowed for corruption-free politics and the proper delivery of goods and services to the people. Evidently there seems to be no risks as such for ESP's satellite projects from both the Maoists' and the government's side.

However, the country is under emergency rule with all constitutional provisions of human rights suspended after the royal proclamation. The proclamation mentions that this step needed to be taken due to the increases in terrorist activities and the rapid deterioration in peace and security. Beneath this lies the possibility of more confrontations between the security forces and the Maoist rebels and more political unrest. This may seriously hinder the timely implementation of ESP's satellite projects and curtail their expenditure. Since the political scenario of the country is fluid, it would be prudent to go ahead with continuing the projects. A revisit to ESP's goal and purpose may be desirable in a few months time.

## **4 ESP Management**

Since it began there have been several changes to ESP's management structure. The Prime Minister's Office (now renamed as OPMCM) has remained as the main liaison ministry.

### **4.1 Management changes**

From **July 2002** ESP was given the responsibility for managing satellite projects alongside its responsibilities for continuing to scope out new projects.

**September 2002** changes meant that ESP had to focus on reform institutions rather than change agents and advocates; and give more attention to the impact of satellite projects rather than searching for potential change advocates. This made ESP's professional staff concentrate more on reform institutions and satellite projects.

In **November 2003** the four-stage change model was changed and the initial log-frame was revised to focus on key areas of governance as per the CAP priorities rather than the full governance agenda. The following changes were made in the management structure;

- an ESP Advisory Committee with two members from HMG (OPMCM and NPC), three from civil society, academia and media, one from the private sector and two from ESP. The OPMCM representative is the committee convener; and
- the post of satellite project support manager was created to tackle the problems of implementing satellite projects. But, the management decisions of satellite projects continued to be looked after by DFID.

#### ***Comments and recommendations***

- The post of satellite project support manager was created for the outgoing project manager. His early retirement has made the post vacant. However, the filling of this post again may not help the burgeoning managerial responsibilities towards satellite projects. Since ESP has been fully instrumental in developing and monitoring these projects it is in better position to manage and handle them. It is recommended that more managerial authority to handle satellite projects be transferred to ESP.
- ESP's scoping of innovative ideas through exploratory activities should be continued. This has been one of ESP's main strengths. ESP's professional staff should be allowed to invigorate for more innovative and exploratory activities. But these staff are already heavily burdened with monitoring the growing number of satellite projects and about 60% of their time is spent on satellite projects, which, according to the present structure, is work that is the responsibility of DFID.
- DEIP is an example of this. It has been seriously hit by squabbles between consortium members and the tense relationship between the consortium and the contracted implementing agency. Had satellite management been the full responsibility of ESP this problem could have been tackled in time.
- DFID must give urgent attention to this matter. ESP's professional staff have the acumen to handle and manage satellite projects. The appointment of additional subordinate staff would make them more productive by releasing them from minor matters. DFID should test ESP by giving it additional management responsibilities.

## **4.2 Role of Programme Advisory Committee (PAC)**

In 2004 a PAC was formed with the overall objective of increasing Nepali ownership by providing Nepali inputs into the direction of the ESP programme as a whole. It is supposed to meet quarterly and help ESP to 1) better contribute to supporting positive change to take place in Nepal, 2) develop its links; 3) disseminate learning from its activities; 4) increase its transparency of ESP; and 5) provide stronger and more diverse Nepalese input to its direction and development.

The PAC's nine functions to advise and help ESP on: 1) potential partners; 2) creating networks and consortia of key actors; 3) priorities and approaches; 4) recommending the relative importance of ESP initiatives; 5) individual exploratory activities and satellite projects; 6) assessing selected ESP programme activities; 7) drawing attention to relevant initiatives external to ESP; 8) disseminated lessons learned from ESP activities; and 9) ESP extending its work beyond the Kathmandu valley. The PACs objectives and functions are given in full at Appendix 2.3).

Although the PAC's objectives and functions are of an advisory nature, the expectations of its outputs seem ambitious given its limited powered and discretionary power to act. The PAC has only met once (23 June 2004). The meeting was more or less a briefing on the functioning of ESP and its activities. Beyond that the PAC members have taken no further initiatives.

### ***Comments and recommendations***

It is customary in Nepal to install such committees. Heavy responsibilities are bestowed on them without them being given any authority. Also, the persons selected as members are highly recognized professionals. Given the way that local culture operates, the opinions or ideas put forward by each member are unlikely to be questioned by another. There is every possibility that the PAC could just be an ornamental committee. The nature of ESP's projects demand extensive brainstorming. This may create another incongruity between the requirements of ESP and incapacity of the PAC.

## **4.3 ESP and Nepali partners**

ESP's Nepali partners range from government ministries and departments to NGOs, the private sector, civil society, and leaders of political parties. Discussions with some of these people revealed their increased confidence in ESP compared to two years earlier during the time of the 2003 OPR. Earlier they used to assume that ESP was an extension of DFID. Now they have begun to consider it as more Nepali owned and take suggestions from ESP more favourably.

## **5 Lessons Learned and ESP's Future**

ESP is the only innovative effort by any donor to explore and support ideas generated exclusively by Nepalis for pro-poor governance. Its official start in January 2001 coincided with the beginning of a new millennium. During the four years since its official launch in 2001 it has initiated some 90 exploratory activities with Nepali partners in key governance areas out of which 13 satellite projects have been developed. Its time with different Nepali partners in different political arrangements has helped ESP to gain valuable lessons, on which the future evolution of ESP itself depends.

### **5.1 Lessons learned**

**From change advocates/agents to reform institutions** — ESP started with the idea of identifying and forming a critical mass of individual change agents/advocates who strive for change in governance in Nepal. But the envisaged four-stage change model was soon amended to focus on reform institutions rather than change advocates. In the course of trying to identify individual change advocates, ESP discerned problems in Nepali society that were not being sufficiently addressed. These were the exclusion of dalits and indigenous people from the socio-economic-political mainstream, and the delayed delivery of services and justice to the people. It was also realized that nourishing individual change advocates would have a limited impact while supporting reform institutions would have a larger impact with longer institutional memories. Reform institutions can better address problems. ESP thus identified key areas of governance through which reforms could be initiated via satellite projects.

**Management** — ESP has shifted from expatriate to Nepali management. The professional staff are handling the 10 ongoing satellite projects well. To enhance its Nepali ownership and direction, a project advisory committee headed by the OPMCM secretary was formed. DFID has faced difficulties in managing the increasing number of ESP satellite projects. Phase I of ESP will finish in January 2006, but the satellite projects will run much beyond that. ESP needs a different management structure to meet present and emerging requirements.

**Project scoping through exploratory activities** — Scoping potential project ideas by supporting Nepali intellectuals, professionals, young leaders and policy makers to ponder an issues and come up with solutions, and bringing eminent international professionals to such occasions, and facilitating the cross-fertilization of ideas has been ESP's exclusive approach. DFID allocated funds to carry out such exploratory activities should be continued in Phase II.

**Satellite projects** — CMP, DEIP, and JEP emerged through such exploratory activities. Anti-corruption projects are being initiated through civil society and business communities. OPMCM is being equipped with a monitoring system to supervise the delivery of services by HMGN ministries. The penal system is being improved by initiating some innovative approaches of open prison and community services. By enlarging Nepali ideas into actions, these projects are able to make a huge difference to governance in Nepal.

### **5.2 A second phase of ESP**

This review recommends that ESP should be continued in a second phase after the completion of its first phase in January 2006. The processes of exploring Nepali ideas through various exploratory activities, putting those ideas into action by enlarging them into projects, and fitting those projects into key areas of governance – all these processes have generated some 13 projects of which 10 are running. These projects have been able to garner valuable support and partnership from key government, non-government, civil societies and private sectors. This

support and partnership is the strength and the value added in the first phase of ESP on which the second phase of ESP should be formulated.

This review's interactions with government officials, civil society and political leaders strongly suggest that ESP should continue supporting exploratory activities in the second phase. They believe that important governance issues demand this. They suggested the following future priorities for ESP.

### **Priority 1 — Continuing the focus on Dalits and Janjatis**

ESP's innovative projects to empower and include dalits and janjatis have addressed the demand side of governance. The armed rebellion unleashed by the Maoists has attracted scores of youths from these communities. This has happened because of the absence of opportunities and very low priority accorded to the youth of these communities and their exclusion from the socio-political and economic mainstream. Belatedly all political forces have realized this and now stress the need for inclusive democracy.

### **Priority 2 — Continuing ESP's focus on anti-corruption and access to justice**

Corruption increases the transaction costs of service delivery and it is the poor who suffer most from this. Both the demand and supply sides of corruption should continue to be addressed in the second phase and ESP should continue its programme activities focused on access to justice.

### **Priority 3 — Strengthening political parties by making them more accountable to the people and the state**

The King's 1 February proclamation installed a state of emergency and suspended many constitutional provisions. The reason given was the failure of major political parties and the incumbent coalition government to cooperate to withstand the rapidly spreading Maoist insurgency. The proclamation has not suspended the democratic constitution as happened in the 1960 King takeover. The proclamation repeatedly stressed the King's unwavering faith in multiparty parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy and the role and importance of political parties in the country.

It seems that democratic political parties will be ever more important in forthcoming days. But weak parties will be unable to wield responsibilities. At present these parties are only active during elections time when they make huge commitments that however lie until the next election. The main problem is not the constitutional or legal framework but the internal weaknesses of political parties that has brought about the current political crisis. These weaknesses are:

- low levels of accountability with central leaders being least aware of the country's problems. They give little attention to the methods of understanding these problems and finding solutions and tend to be reactive rather than proactive;
- the failure of political parties to come to a consensus on the minimum issues of vital democratic interests even on the urgent need for inclusive democracy;
- non-transparent income and expenditure systems with the resulting lack of interest in the anti-corruption agenda;
- little understanding of the importance of the bureaucracy;
- little understanding of the role of civil society and the private sector in strengthening democracy;

- little understanding of how parliamentary democracies are effective in other countries;
- little orientation for party workers on improving their understanding of socioeconomic, political and cultural problems and their possible solutions; and
- lack of discussion forums for the parties' intellectuals and sister organizations.

Due to these weaknesses Nepal's political parties are not functioning well for good governance. ESP in its second phase should address these weaknesses and strengthen the parties by encouraging them to adopt more inclusive, participatory, and accountable approaches in their functioning.

#### **Priority 4 — Developing a responsible media, particularly the electronic media**

The media as the fourth pillar of democracy is a vital sector. Particularly the electronic media is important considering Nepal's rugged geographical terrain. A more balanced, participatory, and accountable media would help to fill the vacuum between the electorate and the elected and between the governed and the governing actors. ESP could assist electronic media particularly FM radio operators outside the Valley to bridge these gaps.

#### **Priority 5 — Make the country's youth and young leaders more democratic and accountable to the people, society and state**

Most of the future leaders of the political parties emerge from parties' student and youth wings. Inculcating the values of democracy and accountability in these young people should pay great premiums in the future. ESP should focus on this issue in its next phase.

### **5.3 Continuation of ESP on reduced basis**

Partial continuation of ESP on a reduced basis or ESP limiting itself to the on-going projects until their end would be tantamount to withdrawing from promises made at its launch. No other donor has so categorically addressed key governance areas as ESP has. The strength and support gained by ESP from its key partners in the first phase and the achievements it has made with them should pave the way for its second phase.

### **5.4 Transfer of responsibility to DFID Nepal**

It would not be prudent for DFID to take over ESP's responsibilities and stand in front of ESP partners. ESP is a cushion between DFID and the ESP partners. Besides, DFID lacks sufficient expertise to handle both exploratory activities and satellite projects. Furthermore ESP is considered as a more Nepali institution and its partners seriously consider to the suggestions made by its professional staff. This social capital earned by ESP should be built up and used into the future.

### **5.5 Registration as an NGO**

One option for making ESP more Nepali owned, more autonomous, and more action oriented, would be to transfer it into a consortium type of institution with important NGOs and INGOs as members. The modalities and structures of some such institutions are presented as follows and in Appendix 4.

**The National Democratic Institute (NDI)** is an INGO. It is not Nepali owned and not autonomous. It derives its core funds from its headquarters to meet its overheads and

personnel expenses and also for some activities as directed by its country action plans. As with all INGOs, it has a five years agreement with SWC. **MS Nepal** operates in a similar way to NDI.

**The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board** was formed by HMGN to implement the government's programmes through a somewhat autonomous organization. It is affiliated with the concerned HMGN ministry which nominates its board members. Its main funding agencies are DFID and the World Bank.

**The Poverty Alleviation Fund** was formed by a separate ordinance and has more autonomy to set up its priorities and action plans. It derives core funds from HMGN to meet overhead, personnel and some initial programme costs. The World Bank supports its outreach programmes.

**Manusher Jono** is a consortium of Bangladesh INGOs and is governed by an autonomous board. It is affiliated with Bangladesh's NGO Affairs Bureau (an equivalent to Nepal's SWC) and derives its core funds from DFID.

In Nepal, there is no law or rule to allow or govern a consortium. The provision to get a license for five years from SWC applies only to INGOs. ESP could be registered at a district administration office as a Nepali NGO with a Nepali board. It could express the composition of its board membership reflecting its consortium nature along with the ToR of each of its member in its statutes and charter. The law requires NGOs to renew their registration every year after submitting their audited accounts. In such cases ESP would have to follow the rules and by-laws for Nepali NGOs. This is the only option left for ESP if it is to be converted into a fully Nepali owned autonomous body. Since it would be a non-profit making body, DFID could meet its core requirements by providing core funds.

## **Appendix 1 Terms of Reference**

### **Nepal Enabling State Programme – Review**

Country: Nepal

Project Partner: PMO

#### **1. Background**

The Enabling State Programme (ESP) was established in 2000 as an umbrella programme to support potential 'change advocates' within the governance sector in Nepal. The programme's original vision was to form a critical mass of advocates for change in Nepali society. This vision was to be furthered through the identification of individuals working in the governance arena whose work could be supported initially through exploratory project and then potentially through larger satellite projects.

An OPR was conducted in 2003 following which an addendum to the programme document was agreed (see Annex 1 [= Appendices 2.1 to 2.4 of current document]) that substantially changed the original design of the programme. The addendum reduced the emphasis on the concept of 'change advocates.' It was recognised that reformers could include organisations, coalitions and others. It was also decided to narrow the scope of ESP's focus to those areas falling within the DFID Nepal Country Assistance Plan (CAP). The new emphasis of the programme was to be on achieving change directly. The success of satellite projects was therefore to be based on progress against purpose. An ESP advisory group was established to provide an external reference forum for the programme.

The 2003 addendum extended phase 1 of the ESP programme office to January 2006. It was recognised that satellite projects might continue after that date. The addendum suggested that options for the continuation of these projects might include: a) a second phase of ESP, b) partial continuation of ESP on a reduced basis c) transfer of responsibility to DFID Nepal.

Since the approval of the addendum ESP has now almost fully committed its budget for Satellite projects. The portfolio of projects being funded through ESP is overseen by a team of Programme Co-ordinators based in the ESP office. ESP also provides financial and administrative support to projects through its finance department, the Programme operates a DFID Imprest account.

#### **2. Purpose of the Consultancy**

The purpose of the consultancy will be to assess the effectiveness of ESP in achieving the objectives/purpose set out in Addendum and revised project log-frame and to assess the performance of ESP in supporting the DFID Nepal CAP.

##### **2.1 Outputs:**

The main output of the consultancy will be the completion of a report that is based upon and provides space for:

2.1.1 An inclusive dialogue with stakeholder groups including project partners, ESP and DFID N staff, the PMO and other governance donors.

2.1.2 An assessment of:

- Progress against the stated purpose of the project ('Nepalese reformers in key areas of governance identified, encouraged and strengthened').
- The extent to which the programme has helped to deliver the objectives of the DFID Nepal CAP.
- The extent to which ESP has delivered on its stated outputs.
- The appropriateness of the current log-frame.
- The development of any new risks that might impact the continuing work of ESP and the satellite projects.
- The performance of the Programme Advisory Committee
- Whether the administrative burden placed on DFID Nepal by ESP can be further reduced through the future evolution of ESP.

2.1.3 A discussion of lessons learned from/by the programme since the OPR.

2.1.4 Recommendations to DFID Nepal regarding options for the future of the ESP, including a discussion of issues raised in the DFID Nepal governance strategy (Annex B). Recommendations should specifically address:

- The options for the future management of satellite projects outlined in the Addendum.
- The long-term sustainability of any continued ESP after January 2006, given the likelihood of declining DFID funding.
- Options for alternative funding of ESP, including multi-donor support.
- Alternative options for the legal structure of ESP after January 2006, including the possibility of its registration as an NGO.
- Lessons learned on working with partners, best practice and innovation.

## **2.2 Objectives of the consultancy**

In order to achieve these outputs the key objectives of the consultancy are as follows:

2.2.1 ensure that the widest possible consultation with stakeholder groups.

2.2.2 consider how ESP can contribute more fully to the achievement of the DFID Nepal CAP objectives.

2.2.3 consider how ESP might work most effectively with other governance reform actors, including other donors.

2.2.4 provide DFID Nepal with a wide-ranging review of ESP that will assist in the completion of an annual Output to Purpose Review and will also support the completion final project reports.

## **3. Scope and Methods of Work**

3.1 The consultants will benefit from 2 days initial consultations with DFID Nepal Governance Advisers and the staff of ESP.

3.2 The consultants will also spend 4 days interviewing project partners, counterparts and other governance actors in Kathmandu.

3.3 The consultant will also undertake a literature review of reports relating to ESP's satellite projects covering 2 days.

3.4 The consultant will also spend 5 days visiting ESP satellite projects.

3.5 Three days have been allocated for the drafting the report, and one day for finalising the report incorporating comments from DFID/ESP.

It is anticipated that the consultancy will last no more than 17 days.

#### **4. Deliverables**

A report discussing reviewing the performance of ESP and options for its future.

#### **5. Time-frame**

The consultancy will be completed by end the first week of February 2005.

#### **6. Competency and Expertise Requirements**

##### 6.1 Essential

6.1.1 Professional expertise in participatory project reviews.

6.1.2 Expertise and experience governance sector programming.

6.1.3 Awareness of socio-cultural and political-economy issues in Nepal.

6.1.4 Experience of working at senior levels of government.

6.1.5 Excellent communication skills (written and oral).

#### **7. Reporting**

The consultant will report to the Governance Adviser, DFID Nepal .

## **Appendix 2 Attachments to Review ToR**

### **Appendix 2.1 Addendum to ESP Programme Document, November 2003 Department for International Development, Nepal**

#### **CONTENTS:**

1. INTRODUCTION
2. BACKGROUND TO REVISIONS
3. REVISIONS TO LOGFRAME
4. REVISED PROGRAMME APPROACH
5. REVISED MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

#### **1. INTRODUCTION**

1.01 The Enabling State Programme (ESP) represents a new way of addressing governance reform. An output to purpose review was conducted in February 2003. Some of the changes to be made following this review relate to improvements in the way in which the Programme, as set out in the original Programme document, will be implemented, but some are more fundamental and involve modification to the Programme itself. They include changing the Programme purpose. This addendum sets out the main changes to be made to the Programme, following the output to purpose review. The original Programme Document, of August 2000, will not be amended, but should be read in conjunction with this addendum.

#### **2. BACKGROUND TO PROGRAMME REVISIONS**

##### **The Enabling State Programme**

2.01 The Enabling State Programme embodies an innovative approach to tackling problems of governance in Nepal. In particular, it seeks to avoid the problems of poor national ownership and imposition of external ideas, which have hampered many attempts at governance reform. It is intended to contribute towards the achievement of pro-poor governance by helping to support a four-stage change process:

**Stage 1:** the development of a better practical understanding of governance and the development of advocates for change

**Stage 2:** change advocates influence decision makers to start carrying out reforms

**Stage 3:** a desire for change has been developed and major reforms are carried out

**Stage 4:** continuing improvements in a new environment of pro-poor governance.

2.02 ESP was intended to play a role in the first two of these stages and was itself intended to run for two phases. The purpose of Phase 1 of the programme was to “help Nepalis develop a better practical understanding of governance issues in Nepal and to build up a critical mass of Nepali advocates for change”. Phase 2 was to be designed in detail towards the end of Phase 1.

2.03 ESP was to achieve its purpose by funding exploratory activities and satellite projects, in response to Nepalese initiatives. Exploratory activities were to be small-scale interventions, intended to improve understanding of pro-poor governance and/or to develop ideas for satellite projects. Satellite projects were to be projects, developed in response to Nepalese ideas, which were to improve some aspect of governance but, more importantly, to help develop Nepalese change advocates. Lessons learned from satellite projects and exploratory activities were to be

disseminated widely, to help in improving understanding of governance and in the development of change advocates. The scope of pro-poor governance was taken as the seven governance capabilities defined in DFID's Pro-poor Governance Target Strategy Paper.

2.04 ESP was launched in early 2001, as a programme with two four-year phases. DFID approved funding of £6.5 million for exploratory activities and running costs (including inception activities) to cover both phases and £13 million for satellite projects in the first phase (January 2001 to January 2005).

### **Experience to Date and the Need for Changes**

2.05 By the end of its first year of operation, a number of difficulties had become apparent. During 2002, some changes were made to the management arrangements. However, more fundamental problems with the programme design were becoming apparent. With the escalation of the conflict, the situation in Nepal had changed significantly from the time when the programme was first conceived. In early 2003 an output to purpose review of the programme was carried out. This confirmed the appropriateness of the earlier changes, identified some further problems and recommended more changes to the Programme. The management changes made in 2002 are explained and set out in a joint DFID Nepal/ESP memorandum of September 2002. The findings of the output to purpose review are set out in the Narrative Summary of Findings and Recommendations, produced by the output to purpose review team in February 2003.

2.06 The main problems may be summarised as follows:

- It has not proved practical to apply the “change advocate” concept operationally and the concept does not give sufficient recognition to the role of institutions and the importance of linkages and coalitions.
- Notwithstanding the practical difficulties with the “change advocate” concept, an approach which tries to address the whole governance agenda based on the four stage change model is questionable in the current circumstances. The conflict has generated new pressure for change and propelled a new group of change advocates into the arena. The need is for rapid progress in priority areas rather than efforts which are thinly spread and aimed at change over the longer term
  - Although support for Nepalese ideas is central to the programme, this has only been applied at the level of individual exploratory activities and satellite projects. There is no effective provision for Nepalese input into the direction of the programme as a whole.
  - The ESP team has been too disconnected from DFID Nepal. Although a high level of autonomy may have helped to ensure that ESP is flexible, ESP has not benefited sufficiently from DFID Nepal advisory inputs or from access to the wider DFID networks of governance expertise. The value of DFID Nepal advisory inputs has been diminished because they have tended to come late in the development of satellite projects.
- The original approach of inviting potential change advocates to submit applications for satellite project funding proved impractical. The number of applications received far exceeded the administrative and financial capacity of ESP to fund. Dealing with them involved an excessive administrative workload and many disappointed applicants.

- Insufficient attention has been paid to capturing and disseminating the lessons learned from ESP activities.

2.07 During 2003, DFID Nepal has been developing its Country Assistance Plan (CAP), which is due to be finalised shortly and which is based on support for His Majesty's Government of Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The CAP sets out the broad strategy for DFID's support to Nepal over the next three to four years. As ESP forms a significant part of DFID support, ESP should fit within this strategy.

### **3. REVISIONS TO THE LOGFRAME**

3.01 The ESP logframe has been amended. The revised version is at Annex 1 [see Appendix 2.2 of current document]. The new purpose "Nepalese reformers in key governance areas identified, encouraged and supported", is consistent with the spirit of the original, but is not tied to the four-stage change model or to the "change advocate" concept. "Reformers" could include individuals, organisations or coalitions and could include those who advocate change and those who have the power to implement change (both "change advocates" and "change leaders" in the terminology of the original programme document). The focus is on "key areas of governance" rather than the full governance agenda. Key areas of governance will be those falling within the scope of the DFID Nepal CAP. This will include not only the areas covered by the governance objective within the CAP but also governance issues which fall within the other objectives, particularly the objectives relating to social inclusion and to peace building.

3.02 With a greater emphasis on achieving change, rather than just developing pressure for change, the success of the satellite projects becomes one of the indicators at the purpose level (indicating that reformers have been effectively strengthened). Developing connections between reformers, between government and external agencies and between Nepalese actors and sources of international experience and expertise also feature as indicators of success at the purpose level.

### **4. REVISED PROGRAMME APPROACH**

4.01 The programme approach described in the original programme document will be changed as follows:

- The programme will no longer be based on the four-stage change model
- The programme will no longer attempt to cover the whole governance agenda, as defined in DFID's target strategy paper; rather it will focus on governance areas which feature in DFID Nepal's CAP. There will be no requirement to cover all these areas or to achieve a balance between them. Attention will be focused where there is judged to be the greatest prospect of success, bearing in mind also the relative importance of the different areas and the extent of any other donor support. The relative merits of engagement through ESP or directly by DFID Nepal will also be considered
- Whilst the main focus will be on areas of governance covered by DFID Nepal's CAP, in keeping with the original intention of ESP, there will be some flexibility for ESP to provide limited support to promising initiatives which fall outside the scope of the CAP, but which can be expected to contribute towards the achievement of the overall CAP purpose.

4.02 It will take time to assess the effectiveness of the revisions to ESP and it will not be appropriate to decide on whether there should be a second phase until sufficient experience has been gained in the new way of working. Phase 1 is due to end in January 2005. Decisions on a possible Phase 2 would have to be made at least six months before the end of Phase 1

(i.e. by July 2004 at the latest). This will not really give sufficient time to evaluate how the revised arrangements are operating. Therefore Phase 1 will be extended for a period of one year (until January 2006). A decision on whether there should be a Phase 2 will be made by mid 2005.

4.03 The budget will be adjusted by moving £2 million from the exploratory activities and running costs budget (which was intended to cover Phases 1 and 2) into the satellite project budget. This will allow for more satellite projects to be funded during the additional year of Phase 1.

4.04 By the end of Phase 1, all exploratory activities should have been completed and the full budget for exploratory activities should have been spent. The full budget for satellite projects should have been committed (i.e. committed to projects which have been fully approved) but, as satellite projects may run for a number of years, the full satellite project budget will not have been spent by the end of Phase 1. Suitable arrangements for completion of the satellite projects still in progress will be agreed by DFID Nepal before the end of Phase 1. Options may include management under Phase 2 of ESP (if a second phase is agreed), partial continuation of ESP, on a much reduced basis, to manage the completion of the satellite projects, or transfer of responsibility for management of the satellite projects to DFID Nepal.

4.05 The original project document stated that ESP would avoid bias towards Kathmandu based projects by setting up a presence outside Kathmandu. Some efforts were made to do this but progress was constrained by the intensification of the conflict. Despite lack of progress on this front, experience to date has been that many satellite project proposals involve activities outside Kathmandu. Kathmandu bias has not been a problem. ESP will ensure that areas outside Kathmandu continue to benefit from satellite projects and other ESP activities, but there does not appear to be any need to establish an ESP presence outside Kathmandu, so this objective will no longer be pursued.

## **5. REVISED MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS**

5.01 To reflect the broad scope of ESP, which includes activities with government, civil society and the private sector, and to provide for greater Nepalese ownership and influence at the policy level rather than just at the satellite project and exploratory activity level, changes will be made to the management arrangements.

5.02 The ESP Project Management Office will continue to report to the Prime Minister's Office (PMiO), which is due to merge with the Cabinet Office.

5.03 An ESP Advisory Group will be constituted to help oversee the development and management of ESP. The Group will comprise two members from Government, representing the PMiO and National Planning Commission, three members from civil society representing academia, activists and the media, one from the private sector, and two from the ESP Programme Management Office. The PMiO representative will be the convener of the Group. The Group will meet quarterly. Draft terms of reference for the Group, which will be finalised when the Group has been formed, are set out in Annex 2 [see Appendix 2.3 of current document].

5.04 In recognition of the progress made in the development of the ESP team, the Nepalese Assistant Programme Manager will be appointed Programme Manager. The expatriate Programme Manager will be appointed to the new post of Satellite Project Implementation Manager. This will help in tackling the problems of implementing a growing portfolio of satellite projects.

## Appendix 2.2 ESP (PHASE 1), Revised Logframe (in Nov-03 addendum)

Narrative Summary	Objective Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions and Risks
<b>GOAL:</b>			
Governance more responsive to the interests of the poor and excluded.	Progress on implementation of the PRSP	PRSP monitoring mechanisms Immediate Action Plan monitoring	
<b>PURPOSE:</b>			
Nepalese reformers in key areas of governance identified, encouraged and strengthened.	Satellite projects are successful.  Satellite projects subsequently scaled up (where relevant)  Through exploratory activities or satellite projects: - Coalitions of reformers built - Government/ non government partnerships developed - Reformers better linked to external experience and expertise.	Output to purpose and final reviews of satellite projects  ESP progress reports. Satellite project reports.  ESP progress reports  ESP progress reports  ESP progress reports (number/quality of exchanges)  (also - for all above: Final review of ESP Phase 1)	Sufficient progress in other areas of governance, not addressed by ESP.  Conflict does undermine progress by diverting attention and resources away from governance reform.  Any political changes which may be required to resolve the conflict do not undermine reforms.
<b>OUTPUTS</b>			
1. Better understanding gained of change processes in governance in Nepal  2. Better understanding of governance issues imparted through exploratory activities and satellite projects  3. Satellite projects in key governance areas designed, approved and launched	Reports produced on change processes (at least 2 per year)  At least 8 events (conferences, workshops, seminars etc) per year, attended by key parties (government, non-government, donors) and evaluated as being successful  At least 4 publications per year, evaluated as giving a better practical understanding of governance issues  Other measures (as necessary) to disseminate lessons from satellite projects.  A total of at least 20 satellite projects in key areas of governance approved and launched during Phase 1 of ESP, which fully commit the revised £15 million satellite project budget.	Reports on change processes  ESP progress reports (and evaluation reports of events)  Publications (and evaluation – based on feedback, media reviews etc)  ESP progress reports  ESP progress reports (and satellite project documents)	The key reformers are identified and engaged through satellite projects.  Reformers can be persuaded to work together.
<b>ACTIVITIES:</b>		<b>INPUTS</b>	
Exploratory activities (action research, publications, seminars etc) to improve understanding of key areas of governance Incorporate learning objectives into satellite project design Exploratory activities to generate interest in and improve understanding of key governance issues Dissemination of lessons learned from exploratory activities and satellite projects Make ESP known to relevant parties in key areas of governance Solicit Nepalese ideas for reform in key areas of governance. Develop ideas into viable satellite projects, building partnerships and coalitions where appropriate.		Budget:	Government and other Nepalese actors demonstrate sufficient interest in governance issues. Sufficient viable Nepalese ideas for development of satellite projects Sufficient progress on governance reform to provide a basis for lesson learning.

## **Appendix 2.3 ToR for ESP Programme Advisory Group (in Nov-03 addendum)**

### **Background**

The Enabling State Programme (ESP) was launched in early 2001. It embodies an innovative approach to tackling problems of governance in Nepal. In particular, it seeks to avoid the problems of poor national ownership and imposition of external ideas, which have hampered many attempts at governance reform. It was intended to contribute towards the achievement of pro-poor governance by helping to support a four-stage change process:

**Stage 1:** the development of a better practical understanding of governance and the development of advocates for change

**Stage 2:** change advocates influence decision makers to start carrying out reforms

**Stage 3:** a desire for change has been developed and major reforms are carried out

**Stage 4:** continuing improvements in a new environment of pro-poor governance.

ESP was intended to play a role in the first two of these stages and was itself intended to run for two phases. Phase 2 was to be designed in detail towards the end of Phase 1.

ESP was to achieve its purpose by funding exploratory activities and satellite projects, in response to Nepalese initiatives. Exploratory activities were to be small-scale interventions, intended to improve understanding of pro-poor governance and/or to develop ideas for satellite projects. Satellite projects were to be projects, developed in response to Nepalese ideas, which were to improve some aspect of governance but, more importantly, to help develop Nepalese change advocates. Lessons learned from satellite projects and exploratory activities were to be disseminated widely, to help in improving understanding of governance and in the development of change advocates.

In response to practical experience gained and to the recommendations of an external review of the Programme, a number of changes are being made. These include narrowing the scope of the programme to focus on a more limited range of governance issues and moving away from a primary focus on the long term development of change advocates to a greater focus on achieving change in the shorter term through satellite projects and exploratory activities.

The emphasis on support for Nepalese ideas remains central to the programme.

The external reviewers of the Programme observed that, despite this intention, the current Programme design only really provides for Nepalese ownership at the level of individual exploratory activities and satellite projects. There is not the same provision for Nepalese input into the direction of the programme as a whole. To rectify this, an ESP Programme Advisory Group is to be established.

### **Objectives**

The objectives of the ESP Programme Advisory Group will be to:

- Help ESP to develop a better understanding of how change takes place in Nepal and how ESP can best contribute to the change process
- Help to develop ESP's links to relevant networks
- Help to disseminate learning from ESP activities
- Increase the transparency of ESP
- Provide stronger and more diverse Nepalese input to direction and development of ESP.

## **Scope of Work**

The functions of the ESP Programme Advisory Group will be as follows:

- Advise on potential partners for ESP (i.e. organisations and individuals working in ESP's areas of focus)
- Help in creating networks and developing consortia of key actors in the ESP priority areas of focus
- Advise on priorities and approaches within the ESP priority areas of focus
- Make recommendations on the relative importance of initiatives being pursued by ESP
- Advise on individual exploratory activities and satellite projects. This could include recommendations, to amend or not to proceed with activities (although it would not amount to a right of veto). It could also include recommendations on new initiatives to consider
- Help in assessing selected ESP programme activities
- Draw attention to relevant initiatives external to ESP (e.g. government policies/programmes or academic conferences)
- Advise ESP on how lessons from ESP activities can best be disseminated and, where appropriate, help directly in dissemination
- Advise on how ESP can best ensure that Programme benefits extend beyond the Kathmandu valley.

## **Group Composition and Management Arrangements**

The ESP Programme Advisory Group will comprise eight members: two from Government, representing the Prime Minister's Office and the National Planning Commission, three from civil society, representing academia, activists and the media, one from the private sector, and two from the ESP Programme Management Office. In so far as practicable, the Group will be balanced in terms of gender and caste/ethnicity. The Prime Minister's Office representative will be the convener of the Group. One of the ESP Programme Management Office representatives will act as Member Secretary.

The group will meet quarterly. It will receive copies of relevant ESP reports, including the six-monthly progress reports.

## **Appendix 2.4 The Future Role of ESP (DFID internal document)**

1. ESP currently has two major types of activity. Satellite projects that support the DFID CAP, and micro-projects that are explore new approaches to CAP related governance issues. Satellite Projects create management demands in terms of administration. The success of the methodologies involved also usually requires a level of capacity building that DFIDN could not directly provide. Assistance has been routinely needed within the projects to assist project partners to work collaboratively and to develop donor reporting skills. Greater help could also be given to partners in developing their own sustainability, particularly assistance with funding requests to other donors.
2. The ESP micro-projects facility has been used to help small initiatives that enhance the discourse on governance issues in Nepal. The fund has supported research and publications on the causes of the conflict, corruption and public administration. The fund has also been used to sponsor roundtable discussions on constitutional reform and to organise workshops on political party reform. In effect the ESP micro-projects fund has become one of Nepal's most effective promoters of informed political discourse and has performed a role not dissimilar to that of public policy think tanks in other countries.
3. With the Satellite Project fund now fully committed ESP is moving into a phase of concentration on project management and of capacity building project partners. The need for this will not end in January 2006 and there are strong arguments against DFIDN attempting to absorb the project load at that point in time. The governance pillar has recently adjusted the police reform figure within the framework allocation through a reduction of £1.5m and an adjustment on decentralisation may result in a reduction of £0.5m.
4. Any continuing ESP secretariat function should be organised to reflect the conclusions of the ESP Review due early in 2005 and also to reflect the change in emphasis from project development to project management. The establishment of small project management units for the largest Satellite Projects (such as the proposed CMP) has been suggested and this is logical. Any such units should be funded from the project budgets involved.
5. DFID should seriously consider the option of continuing to house any new governance initiatives under the ESP umbrella in order to: a) make maximum use of ESP's rapidly growing expertise and management skills b) ensure that the overall project/programme portfolio does not grow unnecessarily. For example where managing partners are planned (such as in the proposed Police Reform Programme) the ESP should be considered for this role.
6. Any proposal to extend ESP beyond 2006 should look closely at the question of its ongoing sustainability. Options for multi-donor funding should be considered and the skills/expertise of the Programme promoted as mechanisms for other donors to use. To ease this process, and also to prepare ESP for a possible life after DFID, discussions should be held regarding the feasibility of changes in the Programme's legal status after January 2006. For example the re-constitution of ESP as an indigenous governance NGO might be one option offering a number of advantages.
7. Should the micro-project fund of ESP remain underspent in January 2006 consideration could be given to an extension (provided the secretariat is extended). This fund should, however, be managed separately to the Satellite Projects through dedicated staff. Dedicated staffing will not only allow the fund to increase its impact but also opens up the possibility of the fund being spun off as an independent, non-DFID funded, think tank.

8. It is possible that savings within the pipeline will yield a small amount of resources for further commitments under the ESP umbrella. Overall it could be suggested that DFIDN has a near 'full' governance portfolio. There is a need, however, to maintain flexibility in relation to a fluid governance environment. There are also some questions that arise from the CAP in terms of small, but strategically important, programming gaps not currently addressed by other donors.

9. Consideration should therefore be given to applying savings in the pipeline to a small number of activities (managed through ESP) that have a compelling justification in relation to the CAP or that arise due to context changes (such as elections or a constituent assembly). Ideally a fund of £2-3 million should be available to enable DFID and ESP to act on:

9.1 Political Exclusion – The cross-cutting principles outlined above emphasis the need to actively promote the responsiveness of the polity to the needs of the poor. DFIDN/ESP has already built up some expertise in this area. The need for such reform is likely to become more acute, particularly if elections or a constituent assembly are called. DFID should particularly prioritise dialogue on social inclusion within political society, civil awareness (for example community radio or Janajati/Dalit federations) and the discourse on constitutional modalities. Initiatives in this area are likely to be small-scale, low cost and best managed through ESP.

9.2 Linkage Problems – The opportunities for synergy between different areas of DFIDN governance programming are significant. DFID should actively seek to promote these synergies, including consideration of modest activities that help to increase the impact or co-ordination of existing programmes. An example might be the area of judicial reform, DFIDN is already heavily invested in the justice sector through a number of projects and a small investment in judicial reform might significantly increase the prospects of success in these interventions.

9.3 HMGN Requests – Consideration should be given to requests that arise from HMGN as a result of movements towards either a return to democratic government or to new political processes arising from a peace process.

### Appendix 3 ESP's Progress Against its Purpose and Outputs

PROJECT STRUCTURE	ACHIEVEMENT INDICATORS	PROGRESS	COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS
<p><b>GOAL</b></p> <p>Governance more responsive to the interests of the poor and excluded.</p>	<p>Progress on implementation of PRSP</p>	<p>- PRSP evolved as 10<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan and began to be implemented from 16 July 2003 for five years (16 July 2003 to 15 July 2007).</p> <p>- 10<sup>th</sup> Plan's PRS consists of closely inter-related 4 pillars essential for improving the lives of the poor, and for mainstreaming the very poor and deprived groups.</p> <p>- Corresponding to the PRSP of the 10<sup>th</sup> plan, ESP focuses on social exclusion, service delivery to the poor, economic and social justice to the poor and deprived and anti-corruption.</p>	<p>- Reformulation necessary keeping in view the changed political scenario and changed priorities of the government.</p>
<p><b>PURPOSE</b></p> <p>Nepalese reformers in key areas of governance identified encouraged and strengthened.</p>	<p>Satellite projects are successful.</p> <p>Satellite projects subsequently scaled up (where relevant)</p> <p>Through exploratory activities or satellite projects:</p> <p>- Coalitions of reformers built</p> <p>- Government / non government partnerships developed</p> <p>- Reformers better linked to external experience and expertise.</p>	<p>- Key areas of governance agenda identified as anti-corruption, access to justice, social inclusion, and service delivery</p> <p>- Reform agencies/institutions identified, encouraged and strengthened to pursue the key governance agenda are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FNCCI and Pro Public</li> <li>• NEFIN</li> <li>• NGO Federation</li> <li>• NGOs working for community development</li> <li>• Janjatis' NGO Federation</li> <li>• Dalits' NGO Federation</li> </ul> <p>- CMEP successful able to get support from court, local govt. units and local people</p> <p>- OPMCM Strengthening Project successful</p> <p>- DOPM could elicit support of government and a supportive ordinance proclaimed in 2004. Regulation will be finalized soon. DOPM found successful.</p> <p>- NGOFP partly successful</p> <p>- NPDP partly successful</p> <p>- CCACP started January 2005</p> <p>- CMP to CMEP and now being scaled up to CMDP</p> <p>- Coalitions of NGOs of Dalit and Janjatis built</p> <p>- DOPMP helped develop partnership between NGOs and HMG/DOPM</p> <p>- CMEP able to draw attention of judiciary system and directive from Supreme Court circulated to all district courts to consider decisions made by CMEP; district courts started enrolling CMEP mediators</p> <p>- Nepali NGO personnel learnt lessons on NGO movement of and linked to Bangladesh NGOs through NGOFP</p> <p>- Regional workshop on restructuring Nepali state (NCCS)</p> <p>- Workshop on better understanding of political issues for emerging leaders by GMSA</p> <p>- Talk programme on the role of facilitators for facilitation of peace talks: Sharing International Experience by FPSD</p> <p>- Workshop on negotiating with the Maoists-Need to bring the mainstream political parties to the peace process</p>	<p>- Expenditure rate slow in DEIP</p> <p>- CSACP, JEP recent interventions</p> <p>-SDPPP only 37 % expenditure but has outpaced HH target coverage. Due to either low targets or over-financing. Needs reassessment.</p> <p>-CMEP be expanded and replicated widely.</p> <p>- Scores of local volunteers developed to implement CMEP easing exit strategy.</p> <p>-Delivery of computers for internet and intranet to OPMCMSP delayed by 4 months.</p> <p>- Open prison and Community Service approaches be expanded.</p> <p>-Scores of local volunteers developed to implement CEC making facilitating exit strategy.</p> <p>Conflict has least hampered the implementation of CMEP.</p>

		- 3-day conference on 'The Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali Democracy' in April 2003	
<b>Output 1</b> Better understanding gained of change processes in governance in Nepal	Reports produced on change processes (at least 2 per year)	- 71 Exploratory Activities conducted from March 2003 to January 2005 of which:  Workshop-Seminar-Conference (26), Research and Studies (16), Action Research (14), Training Programme (2), Publications (6), Televised Programs (4), Videos, (2) Software service (1).	
<b>Output 2</b> Better understanding of governance issues imparted through exploratory activities and satellite projects	At least 8 events (conferences, workshops, seminars etc) per year, attended by key parties (government, non-government, donors) and evaluated as being successful  At east 4 publications per year, evaluated as giving a better practical understanding of governance issues  Other measures (as necessary) to disseminate lessons from satellite projects.	- 8 Events (conferences, workshops, seminars etc.) in 2003  - 18 Events (conferences, workshops, seminars etc.) in 2004  -1 Publication in 2003 -5 Publications in 2004  -4 televised programs -1 video	Target met  -Conferences, seminars and workshops be organized in all key centres outside Kathmandu.  Target not met  Videos and televised programs should be developed in major regional languages
Output 3 Satellite projects in key governance areas designed, approved and launched	A total of at least 20 satellite projects in key areas of governance approved and launched during Phase 1 of ESP, which fully commit the revised £15 million satellite project budget.	Commitment of £13.80 million made on 16 satellite projects during Phase I such as:  - 10 ongoing satellite projects with £10.01 million budget; Spent £2.53 million (25 %) as of Dec.2004 CMEP -B:0.23, S:0.02 (8%) DEIP -B:1.2, S:0.16 (13%) DOPM -B:0.79 S:0.02 (3%) OPMCM SP-B: 0.69 S:0.36 (52%) FNCCI -B:0.2 S:0.03 (16%) NPDP -B:0.88 S:0.46 (52%) SDPPP -B:2.8, S:1.03 (37%) NGOFP -B: 0.73 S:0.40 (55%) JEP -B: 1.52 S:0.05 (3%) SSACP -B: 0.97 S:0.00 (0%)  - 3 satellite projects in pipeline (£3.22 million budget) PIJP -B: 0.2 CMDP -B: 2.8 ISNFDIN -B:0.22  - 3 satellite project completed with £0.65 million budget; Spent £0.53 million (82 %) DGB -B:0.04 S:0.04 (100 %) DPPP -B:0.27 S:0.16 (59 %) CMP-I -B:0.34 S:0.33 (97 %)	- Both targets (no. and budget of satellite projects) not yet met  - Except for OPMCM SP and NPDP all 8 on-going satellite projects go beyond Phase I.  - Merger of PMO and cabinet secretariat forming OPMCM, installation of LAN and internet connections in OPMCM, intranet connections between OPMCM and other ministries and departments, creation of databank of all cabinet decisions after the restoration of democracy in 1990 are done under OPMCM.  - With more than 75 % expenditure remaining, all on-going and pipeline projects need strong institutional follow-ups for speedy implementation.

## Appendix 4 Key Features of Various Institutions

Institution	Type	Goal	Objective
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Non-profit INGO	To strengthen and expand democracy worldwide	To work with and provide practical assistance to democrats in every region of the world to: (a) build political and civic organisations, (b) safeguard elections, and (c) promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government
MS Nepal (Danish Association for International Cooperation)	Non-profit INGO	(a) To improve capabilities and living conditions of Nepali people and maintain their natural resource base (b) To get Nepal evolve into a democratic, plural, just and humane society (c) To improve global equity, human rights and living conditions of the world's poor	(a) To empower disadvantaged and poor to improve their living condition (b) To promote cultural interaction (c) To initiate developmental dialogue between Nepal, Denmark and with the international community (d) To increase MS Nepal's capacity responsive to promotion of MS policy, principles and programs
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board (RWSSFDB)	Non-profit organization created by order of HMGN	To promote cost-effective and sustainable demand driven rural water supply and sanitation projects in order to reduce rural poverty with full emphasis on community ownership and responsibilities.	(a) To deliver sustainable health and hygiene services to the rural population through improvements in water supply and sanitation (b) To increase rural real incomes by assisting women identify ways to earn income from time savings as water is brought closer to dwellings in a cost-effective and sustainable manner (c) To strengthen capabilities of sector institutions, both govt. and non-govt. (CBOs, NGOs, and Private Sector), to undertake and sustain these efforts through management capacity building programs.
Poverty Alleviation Fund (Nepal)	Non-profit organization created by HMGN under specific ordinance	To eradicate rampant poverty from the country	(a) To bring about socio-economic development in the country by implementing poverty alleviation programs in partnership with poor (b) To assist in functions of the agencies related to poverty alleviation for building institutional and human resource capacity of the grassroots institutions (e) To mobilize internal and international resources for the implementation of poverty alleviation programs through the agencies in coordinated manner
Manusher Jono (Bangladesh)	Non-profit consortium of organizations	To become an indigenous trust that will contribute in promoting human rights and governance environment in Bangladesh by enhancing the capacity of and opportunity for poor women, men and children to demand improved governance and recognition of their rights.	(a) To work in solidarity with poor and marginalized people to help them in gaining more control of their lives as well as creating an environment where both duty bearers and rights bearers feel responsible to fulfil their respective obligations (b) Since governance is central to the success of all development initiatives, MJ strives to contribute in the process of improving governance and human rights in Bangladesh through providing financial and technical support to a variety of Civil Society Organization.

## **Appendix 5 Status of ESP Satellite Projects**

### **1. Community Mediation Extension Project (CMEP)**

Coverage: 450 Human Rights and Mediation Committees and 45 women committees  
Start date: May 2004  
End date: April 2007  
Budget: £235,480  
Spent: £20,826.84 (8%) as of November 2004  
Project Districts: Ilam, Jhapa and Saptari  
Partner Agency: CIVICT at the national level and district based NGOs at the local level

**Project status** — Started initially in March 2001 for three years in 45 VDCs of three districts, the project got extension in May 2004 and has been operational in additional 45 VDCs of the these districts. The project has completed identifying the new 15 VDCs for the expansion of the project. Baseline data collection in regard to the number of cases registered has been completed. VDC level awareness campaign completed. Formation of the Human Rights and Mediation Committees (HRMCs) completed in each of the new 5 VDCs of all three districts. TOT ongoing for the selected HRMC members.

### **2. Dalit Empowerment and Integration Project (DEIP)**

Coverage: 6 districts  
Start date: September 2003  
End date: August 2007  
Budget: £1,212,685  
Spent: £162,846 (13%) as of November 2004  
Project Districts: Saptari, Mahottari, Kapilbastu, Gulmi, Baitadi and Surkhet to implement the Community Enabling Programme (CEP)  
Partner Agency: Dalit NGO Federation

**Project status** — Project started in September 2003. An inception review held in December and the new logframe approved by DFID. First round national level activities relating to advocacy and influencing activities awarded to all five consortium member organisations and progress is going on. EPIC (Empowerment, Policy and Institutional Change) Strategy finalised and shared. Most of the national level influencing activities (e.g. radio, TV, publication, hoarding board, interactions) have been focused on EPIC identified issues at the national level. Project has already identified six districts to implement the CEP at the grassroots. Six district coordinators have been appointed recently. They have moved to the field. The field level activities will start soon. DEIP support to organise an international event on caste based discrimination (international consultation meeting on caste based discrimination) was a major breakthrough for DEIP to establish strong international network with the dalit organisations for future advocacy initiatives.

**Remark** — Although the project started on 1<sup>st</sup> of September 2003, the actual project work started from December 2003. The issues around the implementing agency took a while to be resolved from DFID, All the staffs were in place only after December 2003. The management review o the DEIP caused some delay in appointing the district coordinators and has brought some significant changes in the operational modality of the DEIP.

### **3. Department of Prison Management**

Coverage: 4 districts  
Start date: February 2004

End date: January 2006  
Budget: £794,280  
Spent: £22,787 (3%) as of April 2004  
Project Districts: Kathmandu, Chitwan, Banke and Jhapa districts selected for piloting open prison and community services approaches.  
Partner Agency: Department of Prison Management Project (DOPM). Project being implemented by PRI (Penal Reform International) on behalf of DOPM.

**Project status** — DOPM project started from February 2004 for two years. The project has two phases. During the first phase, the details of the second phase will be developed. The project has formed a national consultation committee under the chairmanship of Secretary of MOHA. A five member's project implementation committee has been formed. Staffing completed. A Prison Management Strategy and Plan of Action (2004-2009) for DOPM have been finalised. IT system with DOPM and the five regional offices has been installed. One of the significant achievements of the project has been the promulgation of Ordinance No. 17 which has amended the Prison Act 2019 to make provision for Community Services and Open Prison. The project has already initiated a preliminary discussions with HMG/N authorities for allocation of land in Kathmandu valley and Chitwan for open prison. Agreement has been signed with various partners to provide paralegal and legal aid services to the prisoners in several districts. The project is in the process of finalising the research methodology / questionnaires for the prison management and finalising the training manuals for paralegal services.

#### **4. Prime Minister's Office Strengthening Project**

Coverage: Prime Minister's Office and Cabinet Secretariat  
Start date: January 2003  
End date: December 2004  
Budget: £697,909  
Spent: £362,900 (52%)  
Partner: Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers

**Project status** — Operational in the Prime Minister's Office in Singha Durbar. Code of conduct for the ministers prepared and submitted for approval. Roles and responsibilities of PM's Advisors prepared and submitted for approval. Workshops on anti-corruption strategy and innovation management in the public sector were organised in which secretaries and other high-level officials participated. Study on Service Delivery Mechanism completed. LAN and Internet connections are in operation. Website established. Computers are being installed. Data entry of cabinet decision from 2047 to 2061 completed. Developing indicators for policy audit. No cost extension up to June 2005.

#### **5. FNCCI Anti-Corruption Project**

Coverage: Throughout the country  
Start date: 15 December 2003 with project starting on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2004  
End date: December 2005  
Budget: £196,204  
Spent: £32,000 (16%) as of December 2004  
Project Districts: 75 districts  
Partner Agency: FNCCI

**Project status** — Operational in the centre and all 75 districts. Code of Ethics Forum coordination office established. Code of ethics action plan developed. 3 action research commissioned on taxation. A trust fund established to finance FNCCI's business ethics activities. Complaints unit established in FNCCI. Business code of conduct approved by

general assembly. 25 codes of conduct orientations held in various districts. FNCCI Corporate ethics Forum website established.

#### **6. Nepal Police Development Project**

Coverage:  
Start date: July 2003  
End date: June 2004  
Budget: £887,310  
Spent: £463,293 (52 %) as of December 2004  
Partner Agency: Nepal Police

**Project status** — Infrastructure work on-going in all five development regions. Design of next phase under consideration.

#### **7. Self-Reliant Development of the Poor by the Poor Project (SDPPP)**

Coverage: 60 VDCs of 5 districts  
Start date: January 2002  
End date: December 2007  
Budget: £2,803,397  
Spent: £1,036,597 (37 %) as of December 2004  
Project Districts: Makwanpur, Sarlahi, Dhanusa, Kapilbastu, Mahottari  
Partner Agency: Rural Self-Reliance Development Centre

**Project status** — 60 VDC level coordination committees have been formed. Household coverage to be achieved over the life of the project was 9000 but it has been covered more than 14000 (156 % of the original target). Success indicators such as number of employment, formation of VDC level cooperatives, rural community infrastructures have been achieved as targeted.

#### **8. NGO Federation Project**

Coverage:  
Start date: October 2002  
End date: September 2005  
Budget: £732,222  
Spent: £402,696 (55%) as of December 2004  
Partner Agency: NGO Federation and its regional offices

**Project status** — Various capacity building activities to NGO executives have been conducted. Advocacy on conflict management has been carried out. Established six NGO resource centres in 5 development regions and Kathmandu. Initiated to establish NGO regional profiles. NGO code of conduct is published and oriented to its member organisations. Overall progress is achieved as per the target.

#### **9. Janjati Empowerment Project (JEP)**

Coverage: 48 Janjati Member Organisations of NEFIN  
Start date: September 2004  
End date: August 2007  
Budget: £1,523,935  
Spent: £54,183 (4%) as of November 2004  
Project Districts:  
Partner Agency: Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN)

**Project status** — JEP is the first donor-funded project with NEFIN and Indigenous People's Organisations in Nepal. The project activities such as orientation to the stakeholder, institutional assessment of Janajati organisations and criteria for the Janjati support are being developed. A detailed plan of action has been worked out. The Project Steering committee has been formed and made operational. Inception report is due at the end of February 2005.

#### **10. Civil Society Anti-Corruption Project**

Coverage:  
Start date: 1<sup>st</sup> January 2005  
End date:  
Budget: £972,525  
Spent:  
Project Districts: 10 districts of 5 Development Regions  
Partner Agency: Pro Public

**Project status** — Project works to cover pilot districts of CIAA. Recruitment of central level staff initiated. Budget for the first quarter requested.

#### **Pipeline Projects:**

#### **11. Peace and Investigative Journalism Project**

Budget: £195,136  
Agency: Centre for Investigative Journalism and Himal Association  
Project Status: Final Project Document is forwarded to DFID for approval

#### **12. Community Mediation and Development Project**

Budget: £2,791,923  
Agency: ESP  
Project Status: Final Project Document is forwarded to DFID for approval

#### **13. Institutional Support to NFDIN**

Budget: £220,000  
Agency: NFDIN  
Project Status: Final Project Document is forwarded to DFID for approval

## Appendix 6 Original and Revised Log-frames Compared

Narrative Summary (original document)	Narrative Summary (Nov 03 addendum)	OVI (original document)	OVI (Nov 03 addendum)	MOV (original document)	MOV (Nov 03 addendum)	Assump. & risks (original document)	Assump. & risks (Nov 03 Addendum)
<b>GOAL</b>	<b>GOAL</b>						
Nepalese Key players advocate change to and begin initial action for pro-poor governance	Governance more responsive to the interests of the poor and excluded.	At least 50 public advocates by March 2004. The advocates are starting to produce pamphlets, books, etc., and give seminars, speeches which outline need for reform and provide practical reform ideas.	Progress on implementation of the PRSP	ESP Reports; Independent Surveys including an assessment of progress of plans, policies and programmes	PRSP monitoring mechanisms  Immediate Action Plan monitoring	1. Main power holders eventually susceptible to pressure for change.  2. Political situation does not deteriorate sharply, e.g. to point of crisis.	
<b>PURPOSE</b>	<b>PURPOSE</b>						
Critical mass of Nepalese key players develop practical understanding of and need for pro-poor governance areas with home-grown change potential	Nepalese reformers in key areas of governance identified encouraged and strengthened.	1. A critical mass of 50, including those from outside the Kathmandu valley, by March 2004.  2. "Home-grown change potential areas" are those in which change is implementable and practical.	Satellite projects are successful. Satellite projects subsequently scaled up (where relevant) Through exploratory activities or satellite projects: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coalitions of reformers built</li> <li>Government/ non government partnerships developed</li> <li>Reformers better linked to external experience and expertise.</li> </ul>	ESP Reports; Independent Surveys; Evaluation at the end of Stage 1;  Participatory governance assessment	Output to purpose and final reviews of satellite projects  ESP progress reports. Satellite project reports.  ESP progress reports  ESP progress reports  ESP progress reports (number/quality of exchanges)  (also - for all above: final review of ESP Phase 1)	Nepalese key players willing to act as change advocates.	Sufficient progress in other areas of governance, not addressed by ESP.  Conflict does undermine progress by diverting attention and resources away from governance reform.  Any political changes which may be required to resolve the conflict do not undermine reforms.

Narrative Summary (original document)	Narrative Summary (Nov 03 addendum)	OVI (original document)	OVI (Nov 03 addendum)	MOV (original document)	MOV (Nov 03 document)	Assump. & risks (original document)	Assump. & risks (Nov 03 addendum)
<b>OUTPUTS:</b>	<b>OUTPUTS:</b>						
1. Enough exploratory activities in agreed areas of good governance completed to allow selection process of output 2.	1. Better understanding gained of change processes in governance in Nepal	1.1 20 exploratory activities selected and started annually complying with selection criteria  1.2 All 20 exploratory governance reports completed and accepted by stakeholders.	Reports produced on change processes (at least 2 per year)	1.1 ESP Reports  1.2 ESP Reports; DFID - OPR; PMO - Reports	Reports on change processes	The key players in each individual area of governance feel that they are engaged in a common cause, and so together form a "critical mass".	The key reformers are identified and engaged through satellite projects.
2. Enough projects, selected from exploratory activities in Output 1, designed and launched so as to allow development of a critical mass of Nepalese key players with a basis of practical understanding of governance change needed.	2. Better understanding of governance issues imparted through exploratory activities and satellite projects	2.1 16 exploratory activities selected for development into project drafts annually.  2.2 12 projects approved for implementation annually by Nepalese and donors.	At least 8 events (conferences, workshops, seminars etc) per year, attended by key parties (government, non-government, donors) and evaluated as being successful  At least 4 publications per year, evaluated as giving a better practical understanding of governance issues  Other measures (as necessary) to disseminate lessons from satellite projects.	2.1 ESP Reports; DFID OPR  2.2 ESP Reports; DFID approved submissions; Other donor approved submissions; PMO Reports	ESP progress reports (and evaluation reports of events)  Publications (and evaluation – based on feedback, media reviews etc)		Reformers can be persuaded to work together.
3. Lessons learning is built into the design of each project in Output 2, and lessons and successes of exploratory activities and projects disseminated widely, and especially to those in the group of Nepalese key players involved in the set of projects.	3. Satellite projects in key governance areas designed, approved and launched	3.1 All project drafts contain mechanisms to allow specific lessons to be fed back into ESP [process].  3.2 6 conferences, workshops and seminars held annually attended by Nepalese and donors and evaluated as giving a better practical understanding of government issues.  3.3 4 publications published annually and evaluated as giving a better practical understanding of governance issues.	A total of at least 20 satellite projects in key areas of governance approved and launched during Phase 1 of ESP, which fully commit the revised £15 million satellite project budget.	3.1 ESP project drafts  3.2 ESP Reports; Evaluation reports of the events.  3.3 ESP Reports; Evaluation reports of the literature.	ESP progress reports  ESP progress reports (and satellite project documents)		

Narrative Summary (original document)	Narrative Summary (Nov 03 addendum)	OVI (original document)	OVI (Nov 03 addendum)	MOV (original document)	MOV (Nov 03 document)	Assum. & Risk (original document)	Assump. & risks (Nov 03 addendum)
<b>ACTIVITIES:</b>	<b>ACTIVITIES:</b>						
<p>1.1 Obtain home-grown ideas from HMGN or civil society, making sure that ESO process is known by wide set of stakeholders, e.g. through "marketing" events, literature.</p> <p>1.2 Develop exploratory activities into well-formed ideas and reports, using external expertise as necessary.</p>	<p>Exploratory activities (action research, publications, seminars etc) to improve understanding of key areas of governance</p> <p>Incorporate learning objectives into satellite project design</p>	<p>1.1 Events take place, literature is produced and distributed</p> <p>1.2 ESP office seen to facilitate and support development of exploratory activities (including project scoping, focus/dialogue groups, feasibility studies, study missions, workshops, etc.)</p>		<p>ESP Reports</p> <p>ESP Reports</p>		<p>Donors, including DFID, prepared to fund some of the projects</p>	<p>Government and other Nepalese actors demonstrate sufficient interest in governance issues.</p> <p>Sufficient viable Nepalese ideas for development of satellite projects</p> <p>Sufficient progress on governance reform to provide a basis for lesson learning.</p>
<p>2.1 Select from ideas of Stage I exploratory activities to develop into projects.</p> <p>2.2 Develop ideas into project drafts, using external expertise as necessary</p>	<p>Exploratory activities to generate interest in and improve understanding of key governance issues</p> <p>Dissemination of lessons learned from exploratory activities and satellite projects</p>	<p>2.1 ESP unit selection process.</p> <p>2.2. ESP seen to be working with stakeholders to produce successive drafts</p>		<p>2.1 ESP Reports</p> <p>2.2 ESP Reports</p>			
<p>3.1 Establish system in ESP unit to ensure lesson learning link to ESP unit is built into all project design.</p> <p>3.2 Facilitate conferences, workshops, seminars and publications to disseminate successes and lessons of the exploratory activities and projects</p>	<p>Make ESP known to relevant parties in key areas of governance</p> <p>Solicit Nepalese ideas for reform in key areas of governance.</p> <p>Develop ideas into viable satellite projects, building partnerships and coalitions where appropriate.</p>	<p>3.1 Quality control mechanism in place in ESP unit to ensure all project documents have a lesson-learning link.</p> <p>3.2 Conferences, workshops etc. take place.</p>		<p>3.1 ESP Reports</p> <p>3.2 ESP Reports</p>			

## **Appendix 7 Persons Met in the Course of the Review**

### **8.1 Field Visit to CMP and CEC, Jhapa District**

Jhapa district was visited from 28 to 30 January 2005 to get first hand information on the implementation of the Community Mediation Project and community enabling centres. It was used to derive reflections on these projects from three levels of implementers — district partner NGOs, district HMGN partner agencies and grassroots activists.

#### **Jhapa district partner NGOs**

- Ram Prasad Dhungana, Chairperson, NCDC, Bhadrapur
- Mahendra Karki, Coordinator, CMP/NCDC, Bhadrapur
- Tanka Uprety, Legal Officer, CMP/NCDC, Bhadrapur
- Savitra Shrestha, NCDC, Bhadrapur
- Dayaram Neupane, NCDC, Bhadrapur
- Dilliram Sitaula, Chairperson, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Mahendra Giri, Executive Director, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Sandeep Parajuli, Programme Officer, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa

#### **Jhapa district HMGN's partner agencies**

- Justice Umesh Raj Poudyal, District Judge, Jhapa District Court
- Justice Indra Bahadur Karki, District Judge, Jhapa District Court

#### **Jhapa grassroots level activists**

- Narendra Prasad Ghimire, Chairperson, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa.
- Jivan Prasai, Secretary, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Govind Basnet, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Santosh Neupane, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Laxmi Prasad Chaulagain, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Jagan Dhoj Thewe, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Ms. Durga Devi Mahat, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Purna Baniya, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Shyam Lal Rajbansi, Member, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC, Jhapa
- Dhanmaya Pathak, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Kamala Neupane, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Rupa Rai, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Prem Sitaula, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Narayan Pokhrel, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Rudra Hari Khadka, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Naresh Lamichhane, , Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Raj Kumar Yadav, Sahara Nepal, Kumarkhod VDC, Jhapa,
- Bhim Banskota, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Ms. Motimaya Thapa, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa

- Indra Sivakoti, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa
- Prem Giri, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC, Jhapa

## **8. 2. Central Level Consultations**

### **HMGN**

- Dr. Bimal Koirala, Chief Secretary
- Umesh Mainali, Secretary
- Yuvraj Bhusal, Joint Secretary

### **National Planning Commission**

- Dr. Shankar Prasad Sharma, Vice Chairman
- Bhagawati Prasad Kafle, Joint Secretary and ESP Advisory Board Member

### **Department of Prison Management**

- Yuvraj Pandey, Director General
- Netra Prasad Neupane, Director
- Aditya Man Tuladhar, Project Coordinator, DOPM

### **Nepal Police**

- Kumar Koirala, Deputy Inspector General of Police
- Purusottam Lal Shrestha, Project Coordinator, NPDP

### **Civil society**

- Dr. Om Gurung, President NEFIN
- Dr. Chaitanya Subba, Project Coordinator, JEP
- Hira Biswokarma, Team Leader, DEIP
- Arka Raj Timsina, Project Coordinator
- Gajadhar Sunar, General Secretary, DNF
- Durga Sob, Chairperson, FEDO
- Ram Rishal, Executive Director, RSDC
- Hemang Sharma, Legal Officer, CIVICT

### **Donor agencies**

- Ram Guragain, Senior Programme Officer, NDI
- Mette Damgard, Danida Advisor, Danida/HUGOU
- Dr. Jit Gurung, Danida Advisor, Danida/HUGO
- Krishna Pathak, Advisor, Danida/HUGOU
- Sarad Neupane, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP
- Anil K.C. Senior Programme Officer, UNDP

### **DFID Nepal**

- Alan Whaites, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID Nepal
- Dr. Hiramani Ghimire, Governance Advisor, DFID Nepal
- Phanindra Adhikary, Deputy Programme Manager, DFID Nepal

### **ESP**

- Arun Dhoj Adhikary, Programme Manager, ESP
- Santosh Bisht, Programme Coordinator
- Bandana Risal, Programme Coordinator
- Bikash Man Singh, Programme Coordinator
- Bimal Tandukar, Programme Coordinator
- Stephen Keeling, Editor

### **Field Level Observation (Jhapa District)**

- Umesh Raj Pokhrel, District Judge, Jhapa District Court
- Indra Bahadur Karki, District Judge, Jhapa District Court
- Ram Prasad Dhungana, Chairperson, NCDC
- Mahendra Karki, Coordinator, CMP/NCDC
- Tanka Uprety, Legal Officer, CMP/NCDC
- Narendra Prasad Ghimire, Chairperson, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC
- Jivan Prasai, Secretary, Mediation Committee, Duwagadhi VDC
- Dilliram Sitaula, Chairperson, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC
- Mahendra Giri, Executive Director, Sahara Nepal, Charpane VDC
- Gajendra Acharya, Chairman, CLRC Jhapa

### **Political parties**

- Chakra Banstola, Nepali Congress
- Dr. Minendra Rizal, Nepali Congress (Democratic)
- Gyanendra Karki, Nepali Congress (Democratic)

### **Academia**

- Daman Nath Dhungana, Human Right Activist and Ex-Speaker of Parliament
- Dev Raj Dahal, Chief, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Nepal
- Purusottam Dahal, Chairperson, HURPES
- Purna Man Shakya, Attorney at law (Corporate)
- Radheshyam Adhikari, Attorney at law (Corporate)

## **Appendix 8 Documents and Websites Consulted**

NPC, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, May 2004, "Progress Report on Poverty Reduction – An Assessment of the Tenth Plan (PRSP) Implementation".

ESP – Retreat Report, July 22-23, 2004, Godavari

ESP – Fourth Report, 31 January 2003

ESP – Fifth Report, 1 February to 31 July 2003

ESP – Sixth Report, 31 January 2004

ESP – Seventh Report, July 2004

ESP – OPR, Narrative Summary of Findings and Recommendations, 24<sup>th</sup> Feb. 2003

ESP – At a Glance, January 2004

ESP Update, No.1, January 2005

DFID, February 2004, Nepal – Country Assistance Plan

NCDC, Report Submitted to 14<sup>th</sup> General Assembly, 14<sup>th</sup> Kartik 2061, Bhadrapur, Jhapa

Sahara Nepal, Community Enabling Program-Final Report, 30<sup>th</sup> November 2003, Charpane VCD, Jhapa

Sahara Nepal, Annual Report 2002, Charpane VCD, Jhapa

<http://www.ndi.org>

<http://www.manusher.org>